Introduction

The Significance of the Problem for Israel
The significance of American foreign aid programs for Israel is incommensurate with the size of the contribution comprised by this aid to Israel's state expenditures beginning in the 1970s.
For more than forty years, the fact of aid regularly provided -and significant in quantity -has been advanced by leftist party leaders as a sine qua non for the survival of the State. It has been cast as almost something more important than the State's own military and economic policies, than any considerations of territory, and so on. The threat of losing American aid became a key argument wielded in internal political discussions within Israel's borders. It is the argument used to explain military and political concessions and other measures taken which are -from the point of view of those opposing them -deleterious both to security and to national dignity.
Critics of American aid who oppose the Left insist on the aid's limited effectiveness, and on the negative side effects to which it leads and which outweigh its usefulness.
Magnitude of the Aid and Its Significance for Israel
Historically, American aid for Israel has oscillated between near-zero values in the 1950-'60s and 1.3-1.5% of Israel's gross domestic product (GDP) in the last few years. There were also the two years when it exceeded 20% of Israel's GDP. In the 1970-first half of the '80s, the influx of aid reached its peak; during this period, US foreign aid volume to Israel ten times (that is, in the course of a total of ten years) exceeded the 5% threshold of the latter country's GDP. 
Issues in Methodology
An essential problem in the methodology of the survey has to do with mutual compatibility among the data pertaining to the period under consideration. To address the problem, in different cases either data in fixed prices (from 2009) were used, or aid in current ("historical") dollars was evaluated in terms of Israel's GDP as measured in these same fixed dollar units. FY1960 FY1961 FY1962 FY1963 FY1964 FY1965 FY1966 FY1967 FY1968 FY1969 FY1970 FY1971 FY1972 FY1973 FY1974 FY1975 FY1976 FY1977 FY1978 FY1979 FY1980 FY1981 FY1982 FY1983 FY1984 FY1985 FY1986 FY1987 FY1988 FY1989 FY1990 FY1991 FY1992 FY1993 FY1994 FY1995 FY1996 FY1997 FY1998 FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 
Goals of Aid Programs and Principal Stages and Factors in Providing American Aid for Israel
1962-68
In 1962, with the Kennedy administration in power, the US agreed to provide
Israel with weapons on a commercial basis (that is, to bring down administrative restrictions bearing on trade of this kind). The first large-scale transaction consisted of the sale to Israel of a set of 1962 exterminator Hawks.
4 Ibid., p. 2: "…using foreign aid as an incentive to foster peace agreements between countries in the region." This is indirectly confirmed if we make a note of the fact that aid to countries in the region grew against the backdrop of US departure from Indochina. This last fact is -by the standards of any logic, except for the logic of foreign policy ministry bureaucracy -devoid of significance either in connection with achieving other goals, or for the struggle against terrorism or the "struggle for peace" as such. 1950 1953 1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 Rest To return to the air bridge episode of 1973: the following needs to be made a note of. The bridge began operating on Oct. 14, after a turning point in the way military operations were proceeding had become clearly evident to all observers. 10 The Syrian army had by this time begun to retreat. On this very day, the Egyptians were walloped in the largest tank battle since the days of WWII (G. Meir, 1975; W. J. Boyne, 2002) .
Besides the bureaucratic problems crying out for resolution at the time, this can easily be explained by the extreme disinterestedness on the part of the US military in providing allies of the USSR with an array of modern US armaments in case of Israel's defeat.
The country's leaders justified refusing to deliver a preventive blow -a move which could have obviated the hardship and the losses of the first few days of the war -by claiming that had such a blow been delivered, Israel would have been unable to obtain aid in the record short time that it did, and of the magnitude that it did. "I thought, 'Thank God, I was right not to agree to strike a preventive blow. Such a measure might have helped initially to save fighters' lives, but we would most probably not have gotten this air bridge, which is going to save so many lives now," Golda Meir wrote in her memoirs. 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 During the last two periods, the aim of intensifying the influence which American bureaucracy has on processes in the Near East (officially: "using foreign aid as an incentive to foster peace agreements between countries in the region") has clearly begun to come to the fore.
14 13 Sharp 2010, pp. 17-18.
14 Ibid., p. 2: "…using foreign aid as an incentive to foster peace agreements between countries in the region." This is indirectly confirmed if we make a note of the fact that aid to countries in the region grew against the backdrop of US departure from Indochina. This last fact is -by the standards of any logic, except for the logic of foreign policy ministry bureaucracy -devoid of significance either in connection with achieving other goals, or for the struggle against terrorism or for the "struggle for peace" as such. 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 "Settlements" on liberated territories, including Eastern Jerusalem population growth rate Czechoslovakia had a powerful and well-armed military at her disposal, as well as modern defense fortifications; and yet she surrendered without firing a single shot. 
Varieties of Aid
Economic Aid
Including credit guarantees; this is a quantitatively insignificant component of American foreign aid. Modest-sized (along the order of tens of millions of "insurance" dollars -i.e., an insurance of sorts for Israel's budgetary obligations at the expense of the US budget) amounts de facto provided by the US (or, to be more precise, the very fact of their being provided) But facilitating the obtaining of credit leads to overly simplified solutions for complex problems which may be on the current agenda for leaders primarily focused on the nearest elections. The fact that in Israel this is not a hypothetical threat, but a real one, is confirmed in part by the accumulated burden of state debt. During the last few years, the largest group of expenses, exceeding both security spending and spending on social needs, has been used to service the debt (more than one-third of budgetary spending goes to service the debt, more than 30% for social needs, and less than one quarter of the budgetary expenditure is spent on security and defense). 
Military Aid
Military technical appliances, spare parts, equipment, and so on, sold in part at the expense of the aid funds for Israel.
The decision that Israel and no other should use this money to purchase (obviously, only from the US, and not under conditions of free and open competition) is made in concert with the US government. The sales may thus be determined by the interests of certain groups influential in the American leadership. As long as Israel continues regularly and on a massive scale to make use of the technical equipment being provided, the US military establishment remains objectively interested in these programs as a complement or even replacement for testing the new materiel on its own -all so as to economize on costly service life. What goes into the makeup of the collection of technical supplies Israel is provided with by the US makes the subject of discussion of both specialized and generally accessible materials on a number of sites (see, for instance, material in English 18 ); this question will therefore not be discussed here. of the humanitarian aid -went to Israel, and two-thirds -to her enemies 21 ).
Conditions for Supplying and Using the Aid
The Outcome: Impact on the Motivating Factors for the Political Players Involved
Motivating factors for Israel's leaders:
1. Large-scale foreign aid is, in essence, government income not subject to voter control. 22 But it is also true that the dependence of authority on the taxpayer is one of the an interest of their own in being accountable and dependent, such a thing -barring rare exceptions -does not develop and is not to be observed among leaders.
An extended period of financial "self-sufficiency" of the authorities is bound to lead to the emergence of the notion that the authorities can determine their goals on their own, rather than restrict themselves to traditional ones (defense, security, and justice). Taken individually (as particular politicians and military workers), the cases of independence combined with the "peace process" reproduce relapses into unmediated collaboration with the enemy (consider the example of three notable leftist generals, who defended sources of financing relied on by the HAMAS 24 ).
2.
Fortifying the stance of the leader in the intra-political and intra-party struggle as a conductor of the will of the "manager from without." True enough, if the most important decisions are made abroad (or if it has proven possible to convince the voters that this is the case), then an exaggerated part to play will go to the politician who has the best connections at the center of the real decision making. A model along these lines goes a long way to explain the situation in which the President, the Defense Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and even the Prime Minister of Israel himself do more than merely spend a large amount of time in Washington. They often meet with the same people, discussing similar sets of issues.
Replication and competing for the attention bestowed by a single source of funding are in this case the worst analogue of competition among elected politicians for voter attention and support in situations when taxes and monies levied from voters are the only large-scale source of income for the state.
3.
It follows, then, that fortifying the leader leads to weakened political competition:
the leader does not shirk any means for suppressing the opposition within his own party, 25 even if this (as in the case of the Likud) yields dividends only in the form of a premiership no more than symbolic, and not borne out by wielding any real authority.
4.
Weakened motivating factors for sustaining responsible financial policies (living within the limits of one's available means).
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Motivating factors impacting the political leadership and bureaucratic structures within the US, which are spawned by the mechanism of providing regular substantial aid for Israel: the political (elected) leadership is, on the one hand, interested in having a strong ally capable of solving problems, thus facilitating the defense of US interests. By contrast, interest in having an undecided partner who only provides grounds for criticizing the US without pressuring US enemies, is minimal. The same goes for the military establishment. The State Department is interested in maximizing the period and significance of the processes of negotiation, insofar as specifically they, and no other, are relegated to the establishment's sphere of competence and authorization. The negotiating party subject to pressure is a valuable partner for the State Department. However, it is, by definition, precisely this party to the negotiations that suffers the losses incurred as a result of the negotiations. 
Aid as Leverage for Pressuring Israel
Criticism and Discussion Revolving about US Foreign Aid Programs for Israel
Foreign Aid as a Sine qua Non for the Survival of the State
This view as articulated by Golda Meir has been cited and analyzed above. It has been thoroughly studied by Shlomo Avineri (without providing any precise reference to Ben Gurion, to whom the considerations in question are attributed):
Ben Gurion always had a clear understanding of the fact that the Jewish People is the weaker party in any international constellation. In his opinion, the situation had not changed even after the birth of the Jewish state… Ben Gurion had always acknowledged that the ability of the State of Israel to defend itself is not self-sufficient, but depends on international purchases, funding, and support -that is, on foreign factors. He therefore knew that Israel needs allies north of the Gaza Strip, the Negev, and the Galilee." The memorandum is composed as it were with a view to the future in connection with that Israel will probably appeal for aid in covering the expenses: "Congress may deal with a special Israeli aid request in the future." among the great powers, but he was also aware that these allies are always friends for a time, and that this is the key difficulty in Israel's predicament.
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The description of the situation prevalent on the eve of the Six Day War, as provided in the work of the historian Sterenshiss, confirms Avineri's assessment. (According to Sterenshiss, Ben Gurion was convinced that the Israel Defense Forces would be unable to win the war without the aid of the great powers; this certainty impressed the Chief of General Staff, Y.
Rabin, so much, that it led to his "nicotine poisoning." 34 )
Aid and "US Responsibility for Zionist Crimes"
Yuval Levin (Levin 2000) emphasizes the impetuses spurring the Israeli government to financial irresponsibility; he stresses the anti-Western character both of the Egyptian regime under Mubarak and of Egyptian society, both of which willingly accept aid from the USwhom they continue to loathe.
Yarden Gazit (Gazit January 2011) notes the substantially lower value for Israel of the aid as compared to the burden which the same aid foists upon the US budget (as per his evaluation, taking into account the losses suffered by Israeli industry as a result of restrictions on competition, the real value is hundreds of millions of dollars less than the nominal size of the aid granted). Gazit also notes the deleterious impetuses influencing politicians (including lower responsibility levels of both the political type vis-à-vis society, and of the financial kind), the damage done to the private sector and the support for autocratic regimes. He also notes Israel's acquisition of a "culture of dependence" and image of the weakling in the eyes of her neighbors as a result of dependence of this kind.
Both authors call for a decisive rejection of American aid.
Essential Conclusion
US military aid has not been exceeding the 20% level of Israel's military spending in recent years. Even leaving aside the low efficiency of the purchase-making mechanism and the negative impact on Israel's domestic military industry, we still cannot avoid singling out the key problem bound up with American aid. The less than 20% of the defense spending which is covered thanks to aid provided by the US spells out a drastic drop in the effectiveness of the way the remaining 80% is used.
This reason alone provides ground to forecast a significant rise in Israel's defense capability should the State of Israel reject US military aid. Especially if, following this development, US Congress should discontinue its programs of providing aid for Egypt, the Arab Autonomy [the Palestinian National Authority], and Jordan.
